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INTRODUCTION

Individual consumers and “influencers” 1 review products on the
internet and social media. 2 Influencers inspire and guide the
purchasing decisions of others, 3 but the reputations of influencer
reviewers as honest and unbiased are critical to their success and
gaining large followings. 4 Through their social media following,
influencers have an enhanced ability to communicate messages about
their personal brand and advertise for other brands. 5 Experts estimate
that the influencer market could be worth up to $15 billion in 2022.6
Consumers turn to the internet for product reviews from influencers
who they trust, admire, or may even mistake for peers. 7 Influencers
*

1.

2.

3.
4.

5.

6.

7.

J.D. Candidate, May 2022, University of Baltimore School of Law, B.A.,
Interdisciplinary Studies, 2016, University of Maryland, Baltimore County. I would
like to thank Dr. Barbara Ann White for her encouragement and guidance throughout
the writing process. This comment is dedicated to my husband, family, and friends
who have always believed in my ambition and supported me throughout my law
school career. To the University of Baltimore Law Review, thank you for your
dedication to the process of editing and critiquing this work.
Influencer, MERRIAM WEBSTER (11 ed. 2021), https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/influencer [https://perma.cc/79V6-CCRM] (last visited Aug.
31, 2021) (“[A] person who is able to generate interest in something (such as a
consumer product) by posting about it on social media[.]”).
See Shira Ovide, You Are Being Influenced, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/technology/digital-influencerscoronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/M98Q-3JK3] (“People who say they don’t follow
influencers might have scrolled through updates from an Instagram mommy blogger,
taken a cruise after seeing someone’s YouTube review or bought needlepoint kits
from a person they follow online. Those are probably all influencers!”).
See id.
Julia Brucculieri, Beauty Influencers Who Give Brutally Honest Product Reviews,
HUFFPOST (May 2, 2019, 5:45 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/beautyinfluencers-instagram-honest-reviews_l_5cc9bdd5e4b0d123954d2c3e
[https://perma.cc/3XF7-KQ7G].
See Sapna Maheshwari, Endorsed on Instagram by a Kardashian, but Is It Love or
Just an Ad?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/30/
business/media/instagram-ads-marketing-kardashian.html
[https://perma.cc/LA26DUBP]; Influencer Marketing: Social Media Influencer Market Stats and Research
for 2021, BUS. INSIDER (July 27, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com/influencermarketing-report [https://perma.cc/CS8X-JLTZ].
Cat Carstens, Worth up to $15-billion by 2022—Why Influencer Marketing Is Still
Effective, TOP WOMEN (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.topbusinesswomen.co.za/worthup-to-15-billion-by-2022-why-influencer-marketing-is-still-effective/
[https://perma.cc/52ZT-P2RG].
See Caroline Forsey, These Influencers Are Computer-Generated: The Future of
Marketing, or Untrustworthy Advertising?, HUBSPOT, https://blog.hubspot.com/
marketing/virtual-influencers [https://perma.cc/CFD6-BQ45] (Nov. 19, 2019)
(“[T]here’s something to be said for brands that find real people to promote their
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can build a career by reviewing certain product categories because
brands send free products for public relations purposes, connecting
with influencers, and often contracting for paid sponsorship or
endorsement deals in the future. 8 Through advertising revenue and
sponsored content, influencers can gross anywhere from a few
thousand dollars to six figures in annual income. 9
Advertisers use influencer marketing to engage social media
followers so that they can sell almost anything on the internet. 10
Influencers frequently portray their reviews as unbiased, even though
they may have been paid or received free products for their
reviews. 11 If an influencer was paid to endorse a product or may
benefit from product purchases, consumers should be informed so
that they can evaluate the credibility of the endorsement. 12 The
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) reflects this desire for
transparency by requiring influencers to disclose any “material
connection” 13 they have to an endorsed product or brand. 14
The regulatory guidelines have resulted in various disclosure
strategies across social media platforms as brands and influencers—
each representing their own interests—invented ways to inform

8.

9.

10.
11.
12.

13.
14.

products or services to other real people. Sure, there’s risk involved—but that risk is
the same component that enables audiences to trust, listen to, and connect with those
influencers in the first place.”).
See Maheshwari, supra note 5 (“Brands such as Jack in the Box and Red Bull have
proved willing to pay thousands of dollars per social media mention to people like the
Kardashians and other so-called influencers who command big, loyal followings on
services like Instagram, Snapchat and YouTube.”). Smaller sponsorship deals happen
frequently. See id.
See Joline Buscemi, Here's How Much Money These 7 Influencers Actually Make,
and How, HUFFPOST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/how-much-influencersmake_l_5dee68a6e4b05d1e8a556bbc [https://perma.cc/38RZ-VU2T] (Dec. 19, 2019)
(“We spoke to seven influencers from six different accounts, with followers ranging
from a seemingly attainable 12,000 to six figures, about how much money they’re
making and where it all comes from.”). The influencers interviewed have been
successful, but none of them make millions like the few celebrity influencers that
often come to mind. See id.
See Ovide, supra note 2 (“Some of you must be thinking: People make money that
way? And who cares? Yes, and you should. These ‘influencers’ are shaping our
habits, even during a pandemic and even if we’re clueless about it.”).
See Brucculieri, supra note 4.
See The FTC's Endorsement Guides: What People Are Asking, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/ftcs-endorsement-guideswhat-people-are-asking [https://perma.cc/FQ6U-H8H3] (Aug. 27, 2021) [hereinafter
What People Are Asking].
See infra notes 54–60 and accompanying text.
See What People Are Asking, supra note 12.
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consumers on disclosures. 15 Many influencers and the brands they
endorse continue to look for the line between when they must
disclose a connection and when business dealings can remain hidden
from view. 16
In November 2019, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
published Disclosures 101 for Social Media Influencers to enhance
its educational outreach on the importance of disclosing brand
endorsements. 17 In February 2020, the FTC voted to reevaluate its
enforcement of the regulatory guidelines against the influencers and
the companies that profit from influencer advertising. 18 The FTC
filed a request for public comment on the Endorsement Guides on
February 21, 2020. 19
Under the FTC’s current enforcement structures, 20 influencers and
advertising brands lack incentive to comply with endorsement
disclosure requirements. 21 Moreover, consumers lack both the
15.

16.

17.
18.

19.

20.
21.

See Sophie C. Boerman et al., Sponsored Blog Content: What Do the Regulations
Say? And What Do Bloggers Say?, 9 J. INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH., & ELEC. COM. L.
146, 151–52, 159 (2018) (describing considerable variation in disclosure practices
among influencers). For example, influencers have used #AD and #Sponsered across
social media platforms to indicate a paid partnership. See Paolo Zialcita, FTC Issues
Rules for Disclosures of Ads by Social Media Influencers, NPR (Nov. 5, 2019, 4:57
PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/05/776488326/ftc-issues-rules-for-disclosure-ofads-by-social-media-influencers [https://perma.cc/J25L-9WFZ].
See Boerman et al., supra note 15, at 159; Maheshwari, supra note 5 (quoting Jaclyn
Johnson, president of a firm connecting brands to influencers: “Brands are ‘toeing this
line of how to make it come across as authentic but also in line with the legalese of
social media endorsements[.]’”).
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, DISCLOSURES 101 FOR SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCERS (2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/1001a-influencer-guide508_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KBM-GPZS] [hereinafter DISCLOSURES 101].
FED. TRADE. COMM'N, STATEMENT OF COMM’R ROHIT CHOPRA: REGARDING THE
ENDORSEMENT GUIDES REVIEW COMM’N FILE NO. P204500 (2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1566445/p204500__endorsement_guides_reg_review_-_chopra_stmt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9KBMGPZS].
See Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 85
FED. REG. 10104, 10105-07 (proposed Feb. 21, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
255). See also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Extends Comment Deadline
for Endorsement Guides Review to June 22 (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/03/ftc-extends-commentdeadline-endorsement-guides-review-june-22 [https://perma.cc/NP26-ZKYC]. As of
this Comment, the FTC has not published any response to the public comments it
received.
See infra Section II.A.
See Boerman et al., supra note 15, at 159 (“Additional arguments in favor of
concentrating on advertisers is that here the incentives to comply are probably the
lowest (as disclosure can have a potentially adverse effect on the advertising
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knowledge and incentive to file complaints, except where violations
are flagrant. 22 The FTC has limited enforcement resources and
powers to regulate endorsement disclosure violations, 23 and the lack
of compliance is a market failure that could be corrected by creating
an incentive for reporting, thereby inducing influencer compliance. 24
Congress should enable the FTC to grant awards to consumers who
provide original information that results in successful enforcement
actions because consumer awards would serve as an efficient means
of enhancing reporting and enforcement. 25
Part II describes existing FTC authority, 26 limits to that authority,27
and the challenges associated with regulating endorsement
disclosures. 28 Part III, Section A begins by describing previously
proposed solutions while further examining the practical limitations
of the FTC’s enforcement capabilities. 29 Part III, Section B examines
whistleblower awards granted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as an
effective enforcement tool and a model that the FTC could use to
develop a similar consumer awards program. 30 Part III, Section C
argues that by incentivizing more and improved reporting by
individual consumers, watchdog groups, and social media platforms,
the FTC could regulate influencer endorsement disclosure on social
media more efficiently. 31 Further, it argues that Congress should
enable the FTC to issue consumer awards in combination with other
previously proposed solutions because a multifaceted approach is
needed to effectively regulate endorsement disclosure in the global
online marketplace. 32

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

outcomes), as well as the potential invasiveness and privacy-intrusiveness of
monitoring compliance on the side of users.”); Megan K. Bannigan & Beth Shane,
Towards Truth in Influencing: Risks and Rewards of Disclosing Influencer Marketing
in the Fashion Industry, 64 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 247, 259–60 (2019–2020)
(discussing the conflict between the risk of irreparable harm to influencers’
reputations versus the fear that they will alienate their audience by disclosing material
connections).
See infra notes 131–36 and accompanying text.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra notes 131–44 and accompanying text.
See infra Section III.C.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section III.C.
See infra Section III.C.
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II. FTC ENDORSEMENT DISCLOSURE EDUCATION, RULEMAKING, AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Congress empowered the FTC to regulate unfair and deceptive
trade practices and make rules to which industries must adhere. 33 The
agency’s multifaceted efforts involve preventative education for
consumers, influencers, and brands. 34 The FTC’s communication
with consumers is essential because consumer complaints are the
primary means by which the agency can enforce the endorsement
disclosure rules in court. 35
A. As Part of Implementing its Consumer Protection Mission, the
FTC Regulates and Enforces Endorsement Disclosure Rules
Through Limited Congressionally Delegated Authority.
The FTC began its consumer protection mission after the WheelerLea Amendments in 1938. 36 Through the FTCA, Congress granted
the FTC the authority to gather information and discipline unfair and
deceptive trade practices. 37 The Consumer Protection Division of the
FTC regulates unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent business practices by
collecting consumer complaints, filing suits against companies,
developing trade regulation and rules, and educating consumers. 38
Through its extraordinary powers, the FTC can “bring cases against
individual companies, partnerships, individuals, the professions, trade
associations, successors to dissolved corporations, and, in some
33.

34.

35.

36.
37.
38.

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2018) (“The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to
prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.”); Rules, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/rules [https://perma.cc/UZ8Y-9PYT] (last visited Aug. 29, 2021).
See, e.g., DISCLOSURES 101, supra note 17, at 2 (providing an educational resource for
influencers that describes their duty to disclose material connections with brands they
endorse); FTCvideos, The FTC’s Endorsement Guides – Business Tips, YOUTUBE
(Dec.
18,
2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D6SQOy1ukDQ
[https://perma.cc/P5G8-6VQB].
See Lauryn Harris, Comment, Too Little, Too Late: FTC Guidelines on “Deceptive
and Misleading” Endorsements by Social Media Influencers, 62 HOW. L.J. 947, 982
(2019). The complaint-based system has been criticized for putting the burden on
consumers to report disclosure violations. Id. at 950 (“In regard to detection, the
Guidelines are vague and minimal in the policing of social media influencers.
Ultimately, they place the responsibility on consumers to file complaints rather than
the FTC to implement effective detection measures proactively.”).
CHRIS HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 3 (2016).
15 U.S.C. § 41 (2018). See also Federal Trade Commission Act, FED. TRADE
COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes/federal-trade-commission-act
[https://perma.cc/DLK4-H6FF] (last visited Sept. 3, 2021).
HOOFNAGLE, supra note 36, at 90.
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situations, nonprofits, and even government agencies” by filing
administrative complaints in federal court. 39
The FTC can bring an administrative complaint if it “ha[s] reason
to believe that any such person, partnership, or corporation has been
or is using any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive
act or practice in or affecting commerce” and finds that on its face,
the proceeding is in the interest of the public. 40 Because of the FTC’s
authority to prevent violations of the FTCA, the agency “can sue to
prevent practices even where they are commonplace in the market”
and even “where the public has not yet been injured . . . .” 41 After
charges are brought through an administrative proceeding, the FTC
may issue a consent agreement so a respondent can chose to settle or
contest the charges at a trial-type proceeding before an administrative
law judge (ALJ). 42
If the respondent contests the charges, the ALJ will issue a decision
that can be appealed in any United States Court of Appeals that has
jurisdiction over the respondent and the claim. The Commission will
then issue an order from the ALJ’s decision. 43 “If a respondent
violates a final order, it is liable for a civil penalty for each
violation.” 44 To enforce an order and impose a penalty, the FTC must
file suit in federal district court. 45
After the Commission enters an administrative order, the agency
may seek redress in federal district court for consumers who were
injured by the respondent. 46 The FTC must show that a reasonable
man would have known under the circumstances that the conduct for
which the respondent was found liable for by the Commission’s order
was dishonest or fraudulent. 47 The FTC must prove actual damages;
punitive and exemplary damages are not allowed. 48

39.
40.
41.
42.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 98.
15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2018).
HOOFNAGLE, supra note 36, at 99.
A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law Enforcement,
TRADE
COMM’N
(Oct.
2019),
and
Rulemaking
Authority,
FED.
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority
[https://perma.cc/PB86-ANB4].
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(c)).
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(l)).
Id. (A federal judge “may also issue ‘mandatory injunctions’ and ‘such other and
further equitable relief’ as is deemed appropriate.”).
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(2) (2018) (“If the Commission satisfies the court that the act or
practice to which the cease and desist order relates is one which a reasonable man
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The FTC may enforce an order against nonrespondents “who
thereafter violate the standards articulated by the Commission”
through civil penalties. 49 However, the agency must prove to a
federal court that the nonrespondent had “‘actual knowledge that
such act or practice is unfair or deceptive and is unlawful’ under
Section 5(a)(1) of the FTC Act.” 50 The FTC can also file actions in
federal court without first determining through an ALJ decision that
the conduct was unlawful. 51 The FTC must show it has “reason to
believe” a party is violating or will violate any provision of law the
FTC enforces. 52 Most often, the relief requested is injunctive, but the
FTC also requests monetary equitable relief such as restitution and
rescission of contracts. 53 In conclusion, the FTC has several options
for enforcing the endorsement regulations through its administrative
procedures and actions in federal court.
B. The FTC Enforces Section 5 of the FTCA in Endorsement
Disclosure Cases.
The FTC files endorsement disclosure violation actions in federal
court using Section 5 of the FTCA, “which generally prohibits
deceptive advertising.” 54 The FTC views advertising and promotional
messages as deceptive “if they mislead consumers into believing they
are independent, impartial, or not from the sponsoring advertiser
itself.” 55 Deceptive online advertising content “distorts the online

48.

49.
50.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

would have known under the circumstances was dishonest or fraudulent, the court
may grant relief under subsection (b).”).
15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (2018) (“Such relief may include, but shall not be limited to,
rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund of money or return of property, the
payment of damages, and public notification respecting the rule violation or the unfair
or deceptive act or practice, as the case may be; except that nothing in this subsection
is intended to authorize the imposition of any exemplary or punitive damages.”).
A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law Enforcement,
and Rulemaking Authority, supra note 42.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B)). “To prove ‘actual knowledge,’ the
Commission typically shows that it provided the violator with a copy of the
Commission determination about the act or practice in question, or a ‘synopsis’ of that
determination.” Id. Meaning, the FTC has to be aware of a nonrespondent’s potential
for violations, and the Commission must inform them of the recent order to impose a
civil penalty in federal court. See id.
See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2018).
See 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (2018).
See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law
Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, supra note 42.
What People Are Asking, supra note 12.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTIVELY
FORMATTED ADVERTISEMENTS (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
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marketplace, preventing consumers from making informed
purchasing decisions and creating an uneven playing field for those
that follow the rules.” 56 There are three key elements of a deception
case: “There must be (1) a representation, omission or practice that is
likely to mislead a consumer; (2) the interpretation of that act or
practice is considered from the perspective of a reasonable consumer;
and (3) the representation must be material.” 57
The public has struggled to understand what the law means in
practice. 58 In short, influencers must disclose “material connections”
to companies for whom they endorse in a clear and conspicuous
manner. 59 “[I]f there’s a connection between an endorser and the
marketer that consumers would not expect and it would affect how
consumers evaluate the endorsement, that connection should be
disclosed.” 60 The FTC describes clear and conspicuous disclosure as:
[C]lose to the claims to which they relate; in a font that is
easy to read; in a shade that stands out against the
background; for video ads, on the screen long enough to be
noticed, read, and understood; for audio disclosures, read at
a cadence that is easy for consumers to follow and in words
consumers will understand. 61
The FTC directs influencers to disclose connections when they
have “any financial, employment, personal, or family relation with a
brand.” 62 The agency encourages influencers to disclose even if they
think their reviews are unbiased or followers are already aware of the
connection. 63 Under the “clear and conspicuous” standard,
influencers should always disclose in any type of social media post in

56.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

public_statements/896923/151222deceptiveenforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/NN2R5M4V].
Noah Joshua Phillips, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote at the ANA/BAA
Marketing Law Conference: The FTC and the Digital Marketplace: Highlights from
the Last Year 6–7 (Nov. 5, 2019) (transcript available at https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/public_statements/1553177/phillips_-_ana_remarks_11-519.pdf [https://perma.cc/59WM-5QBE]).
HOOFNAGLE, supra note 36, at 123.
See Boerman et al., supra note 15, at 159.
See What People Are Asking, supra note 12.
Id.
Id.
See DISCLOSURES 101, supra note 17, at 3.
Id. In video endorsements, the disclosure should be in the video, not just the
description below, and during live streamed video, the disclosure should be repeated
periodically. Id. at 4.
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a way that is “hard to miss” or in the body of the endorsement. 64 The
Endorsement Guides provide an overview of FTC regulatory
standards, and influencer practices inconsistent with the Guides can
result in enforcement actions alleging violations of Section 5 of the
FTCA. 65
The FTC can enforce against only some who violate regulations,
even if competitors engage in the same practices. 66 The agency “is
entrusted with great discretion in matter selection and priority
setting.” 67 The brands paying influencers to endorse a product are
responsible for informing the influencers of the endorsement
disclosure requirements. 68 The FTC has focused on filing complaints
against brands, ad agencies, and public relations firms rather than
individual influencers, 69 except where influencers violate the
regulations repeatedly. 70
Once a violation is reported, the FTC has broad investigative
authority to substantiate its claims on behalf of consumers through
compulsory processes. 71 Under Section 6 of the FTCA, the agency
has the authority “[t]o gather and compile information concerning,
and to investigate from time to time the organization, business,
conduct, practices, and management of any person, partnership, or
corporation engaged in or whose business affects commerce.” 72
Therefore, even without a consumer complaint, the FTC can
investigate endorsement disclosure activity on social media. 73
The FTC “lacks ‘aiding and abetting’ 74 authority, except where
granted by statute (e.g., in telemarketing and spam enforcement

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
See What People Are Asking, supra note 12.
HOOFNAGLE, supra note 36, at 99.
Id. at 100.
Zialcita, supra note 15.
Id. (“[I]n terms of our own law enforcement activities, our focus so far has been on
advertisers or their ad agencies and public relations firms.”).
See id. (“The consumer watchdog agency's first-ever complaint against social media
influencers came in 2017, when it charged two popular YouTubers with failing to
disclose that they own an online gambling service they were endorsing.”).
HOOFNAGLE, supra note 36, at 102–03.
15 U.S.C. § 46(a) (2018).
See What People Are Asking, supra note 12.
See SEC v. Apuzzo, 689 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2012). In order for a defendant to be
liable as an aider and abettor in a civil enforcement action, the SEC must prove: “(1)
the existence of a securities law violation by the primary (as opposed to the aiding and
abetting) party; (2) ‘knowledge’ of this violation on the part of the aider and abettor;
and (3) ‘substantial assistance’ by the aider and abettor in the achievement of the
primary violation.” Id.
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matters)[,]” 75 but “at least two courts have imposed liability for
aiding and abetting frauds.” 76 Congress has refused to grant the FTC
authority to bring Section 5 cases against those who “‘knowingly or
recklessly’ . . . provide substantial assistance to another[,]” 77 but the
FTC has used a “means and instrumentalities” theory in cases where
there is contributory liability78 because the respondent facilitated an
unfair or deceptive trade practice. 79
In a Section 5 case regarding failure to disclose a material
connection, a court is unlikely to impose liability on a brand unless
there was an effort to mislead consumers on the part of the brand or
its agents, such as ad agencies or public relations firms. 80 However,
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

HOOFNAGLE, supra note 36, at 98.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Seena Gressin, FTC Challenges Bloated Weight-Loss Claims, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Apr. 21, 2017, 11:05 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/
business-blog/2017/04/ftc-challenges-bloated-weight-loss-claims
[https://perma.cc/L6N7-AZJ5].
[T]he complaint alleged the defendants gave their licensees and
franchisees the means to deceive consumers by giving them
training, support, and marketing materials that contained the
deceptive claims and contracts with the gag clause. This count is a
reminder that, when appropriate, the FTC will seek to hold
companies responsible not only for their deceptive practices, but
also for giving others the “means and instrumentalities” to
commit deceptive and unfair practices.

80.

Id.
See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 36, at 124–25; e.g., Lesley Fair, FTC’s Teami Case:
Spilling the Tea About Influencers and Advertisers, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 6,
2020, 11:22 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2020/03/ftcsteami-case-spilling-tea-about-influencers-advertisers [https://perma.cc/P2YQ-XBK8].
The complaint alleges the defendants took in more than $15
million by deceptively claiming their array of teas could cause
rapid and substantial weight loss, “fight against cancerous cells,”
decrease migraines, unclog arteries, and prevent colds and flu.
What’s different is the “how.” The defendants advertised
primarily through a massive social media campaign. Also notable
is the “who” – a roster of celebrities and influencers, some of
whom have now been sent warning letters reminding them of
their legal obligation to disclose their connections to the products
they promote.
Id.
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the FTC does not need to establish an intent to deceive as an element
of a deception case. 81 Without further authorization from Congress,
the FTC has limited authority to enforce the endorsement disclosure
regulations against advertisers. 82
III. AN ENFORCEMENT TOOL TO ENHANCE REPORTING
AND THEREBY INCREASE COMPLIANCE
The FTC has the “formidable job” of enforcing the endorsement
disclosure regulations in “the social media age[.]” 83 The FTC has
limited tools, however, to accomplish this task in the global internet
marketplace. 84 Various proposed solutions relate to clarifying the
regulations, encouraging partnership within the industry, and
increasing penalties. 85 The SEC uses whistleblower awards as an
enforcement tool to encourage reporting of securities fraud
violations, 86 and the FTC could do something similar to encourage
reporting of endorsement disclosure violations. 87 Congress should
enable the FTC to award consumers for information resulting in
successful enforcement action. 88 Nevertheless, the FTC should take a
tailored approach to using consumer awards, 89 and the enforcement
tool may work best in conjunction with other previously proposed
solutions.90 Additionally, the FTC should partner with
nongovernmental entities and individual consumers to enhance
enforcement, 91 and the agency could use consumer awards as an
effective method of encouraging more frequent and more thorough
reporting. 92
A. Other Proposed Solutions Could Enhance FTC Enforcement.
Numerous proposals have surfaced in the last several years
regarding endorsement disclosure regulation. 93 Most proposals
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

HOOFNAGLE, supra note 36, at 124–25. A court is less likely, however, to find a social
media platform liable for facilitating nondisclosure in some form. See id. at 98.
Id.
Tyler Fredericks, Note, Not Content with Content Influencers: How the FTC Should
Promote Advertisement Disclosure, 19 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 29 (2019).
See supra Section II.B.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section III.C.
See infra notes 122–30 and accompanying text.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra notes 150–56 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 169–74 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 96–115 and accompanying text.
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concern influencer education on proper compliance with the
Endorsement Guide. 94 The solutions provide an overview of potential
gaps in the FTC’s regulatory structure and approach to endorsement
disclosure violations. 95
The FTC is concerned with regulating the clarity and sufficiency of
endorsement disclosures so that they are “clear and conspicuous” for
the public. 96 For example, others have suggested that the FTC could
adopt an emoji or series of emojis as a disclosure tool that would
leverage a popular method of communication. 97 Emoji use could
increase public trust and compliance by easing the burden on
influencers: 98
In fact, there may already be demand for one-character
disclosure emojis. One YouTube influencer created a selfmade symbol system to quickly show which products she
bought herself, which are sponsored, and which she
received from a company. Influencers who are creating such
symbols themselves are a great example of why quick, easyto-spot disclosures are important. These disclosure emojis
would be even more effective if they were standardized
across influencers, so that individual influencers did not
have to take self-help measures to design their own emojis
and prescribe meaning to them. This is an area where the
FTC could lead and adopt a twenty-first century solution to
the problem of influencer disclosures. 99
The FTC would need to educate the public and influencers about
emoji usage for endorsement disclosure, 100 but the simplicity of
94.
95.

See infra notes 95–106 and accompanying text.
See Boerman et al., supra note 15, at 150, 158 (remarking on the shortcomings of
FTC regulations); see also infra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.
96. See Big Print. Little Print. What’s the Deal?, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 2000),
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/big-print-little-print-whatsdeal [https://perma.cc/V7NQ-RPXS].
97. Christina Sauerborn, Note, Making the FTC ☺: An Approach to Material
Connections Disclosures in the Emoji Age, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 571, 626–28 (2018) (“Since the interface of every social media platform is
different, there is no uniform disclosure method that works across all of them. Emoji
can easily be incorporated into Instagram captions, tweets, Facebook posts, and onscreen text in YouTube videos.”); Fredericks, supra note 83, at 47–48 (citing id. at
626–27).
98. See Sauerborn, supra note 97, at 576–77; Fredericks, supra note 83, at 47–48.
99. Fredericks, supra note 83, at 48.
100. See id.
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communicating through emojis could decrease the burden of
communicating the disclosure requirements and complying with
them. 101
FTC regulations could more explicitly guide influencers on how to
disclose in a “clear and conspicuous” manner. 102 Attempts have been
made before: in 2017, the FTC sent letters directly to influencers and
brands reminding them of their disclosure obligations, 103 and also
published Disclosures 101 for Social Media Influencers. 104 Proposals
have suggested that the FTC could work with social media platforms
to flag violators and educate influencers, businesses, and
celebrities. 105 Platforms could require users to view a disclosure
tutorial before accessing their accounts 106 while consumer advocacy
groups could help police the digital sphere with specialized
knowledge. 107
Others have suggested that the FTC hold brands doing business
with influencers more accountable. 108 The FTC could collaborate
101. See id. at 47 (“Since disclosures are costly in themselves, if the FTC provided a way
to minimize these costs to influencers, it might see additional compliance.”).
102. See, e.g., Ashley Luong, Note, All that Glitters Is Gold: The Regulation of Hidden
Advertisements and Undisclosed Sponsorships in the World of Beauty Social Media
Influencers, 11 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 565, 592, 595 (2020) (proposing changes
to the endorsement disclosure regulations that mirror Germany’s approach, which
provides specific guidance on when and how to disclose in particular scenarios).
103. FTC Staff Reminds Influencers and Brands to Clearly Disclose Relationship, FED.
TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2017/04/ftc-staff-reminds-influencers-brands-clearly-disclose
[https://perma.cc/5MS4-V5EN] (“After reviewing numerous Instagram posts by
celebrities, athletes, and other influencers, [FTC] staff recently sent out more than 90
letters reminding influencers and marketers that influencers should clearly and
conspicuously disclose their relationships to brands when promoting or endorsing
products through social media.”); see also Luong, supra note 102, at 581–82
(describing the details of the warning letters and criticizing their effectiveness).
104. See Zialcita, supra note 15.
105. Vanessa Chan, Article, When #AD is #BAD: Why the FTC Must Reform Its
Enforcement of Disclosure Policy in the Digital Age, 13 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J. 303, 326–
27 (2019) (“Instagram has also begun sending in-app notifications to users who are
flagged by the system for making a post that it believes is branded without
disclosure.”); see also Luong, supra note 102, at 598–600.
106. Chan, supra note 105, at 321–22.
107. Id. at 329. “The FTC should also consider working with some outside groups with
specialized knowledge, as outside policing is an additional resource that may help
with catching influencers who otherwise slip through the cracks.” Id. For example,
“[a]fter criticizing the FTC for their passive enforcement of disclosure policy, Public
Citizen conducted its own survey on influencer disclosure and was largely responsible
for initiating the FTC's warning letters.” Id.
108. Id. at 327–28 (“[B]usinesses should be required to monitor sponsored posts for
compliance, and if they find a violation, businesses should get into contact with the
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with brands who would notify influencers of endorsement regulations
with their public relations packages. 109 In addition, brands could have
the option to revise their contracts with influencers to explicitly
outline FTC disclosure guidelines by including a clause allowing
them to terminate the relationship if influencers fail to disclose
endorsements appropriately. 110 This voluntary industry-led approach
may help supplement regulatory efforts. 111
Others have argued that the FTC should more frequently use
monetary punishment and suspension of social media accounts to
deter violations. 112 Even further, the FTC could pursue enforcement
against micro-influencers, instead of targeting top influencers. 113
Ultimately, advertising brands should bear the burden of compliance
“as the least cost avoiders[.]” 114
To avoid “patchwork fixes,” previous proposals have emphasized
that the FTC must communicate the endorsement disclosure
requirements so that the standards for compliance are clear to the
influencer marketing industry. 115 However, the focus should be on
whether enforcement tools are efficient for compelling compliance.
The FTC can take action to enforce regulations, but if consumer
complaints do not represent the true number of violations, those
actions may have a diluted effect on increasing compliance. 116 As
proposed below, the FTC should partner with individual consumers
and watchdog groups by providing an incentive for reporting
violations. 117

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

influencer as soon as possible to either take down the post or to add a proper
disclosure to the post.”).
Luong, supra note 102, at 601 (“Simply placing notices and resources in PR packages
raises more awareness to the laws than simply monitoring influencers and sending
strongly worded letters.”).
Elizabeth Casale, Article, Influencing the FTC to Update Disclosure Rules for the
Social Media Era, 40 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC. 1, 21–22 (2019).
See id. at 22.
Chan, supra note 105, at 324 (“Enforcing monetary punishments can serve to deter
other influencers once they see that the policy is actually being enforced.”).
Fredericks, supra note 83, at 29–30.
Id. at 30. Advertisers can more readily spread the cost of complying with the
endorsement guides, and they are in the best position to inform influencers of the
standards for compliance. Id. at 51–52.
See Fredericks, supra note 83, at 29–30.
See Boerman et al., supra note 15, at 159.
See infra Section III.B.
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B. The FTC Should Issue Awards to Encourage Disclosure
Violation Reporting.
Enforcement agencies have developed whistleblower 118 award
programs to “incentivize whistleblowers with specific, timely and
credible information” to report violations. 119 Whistleblower awards
are granted when a nongovernment entity or individual reports a
violation to an agency and the complaint results in an enforcement
action against the defendant. 120 For example, the SEC has issued
awards since 2012 from “an investor protection fund established by
Congress that is financed entirely through monetary sanctions paid to
the SEC by securities law violators.” 121 Whistleblowers may receive
an award ranging from “10[%] to 30[%] of the money collected when
the monetary sanctions exceed $1 million” if they “voluntarily
provide the SEC with original, timely, and credible information that
leads to a successful enforcement action.” 122 The IRS has a similar
whistleblower or informant award program for tax evasion reports. 123
The FTC should similarly offer awards to consumers for
information resulting in a successful enforcement action. The FTC
could grant awards based on a percentage of the monetary sanctions
obtained in an enforcement action. 124 In addition, awards might only
be granted for complaints that provide the first report containing
original information. 125

118. Whistleblower, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Whistleblowers are
typically employees in a company. Id. The term would not apply to an award issued to
a consumer. This Comment will refer to awards the FTC would grant as “consumer
awards.”
119. See, e.g., Whistleblower Awards Over $900 Million, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/page/whistleblower-100million [https://perma.cc/LD89-X97W]
(June 4, 2020).
120. See id.; see also Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Record $114 Million
Whistleblower Award (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/new/press-release/2020266 [https://perma.cc/LD89-X97W].
121. Press Release, SEC Issues Record $114 Million Whistleblower Award, supra note
120.
122. Id.
123. See Whistleblower Office, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/compliance/whistlebloweroffice#rules [https://perma.cc/NTX2-K3XX] (June 8, 2021). The IRS issues awards
on a percentage basis depending on the amount of unpaid taxes collected. Id.
Whistleblowers who are denied an award or feel they should have been given more
can appeal to the Tax Court. Id.
124. See, e.g., id.; see also Press Release, SEC Issues Record $114 Million Whistleblower
Award, supra note 120.
125. See generally Press Release, SEC Issues Record $114 Million Whistleblower Award,
supra note 120.
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The FTC should revise the complaint process without making it too
onerous. 126 If a consumer or consumer advocacy group were to file a
complaint expecting to obtain an award, the FTC could charge an
administrative fee. Court costs are incurred when a plaintiff files a
complaint with a federal district court. 127 Similarly, the FTC could
institute a processing fee to cover the cost of investigating and
substantiating complaints. 128 The FTC could refund the fee if the
complaint is found to be credible and keep the fee if the complaint is
found to be false. After three or more false reports, the FTC could opt
to no longer allow the complainant to collect an award. The FTC
should have the discretion to deny the opportunity to collect an
award. An administrative appeal process could be available for
complainants who are denied the future ability to collect an award. 129
The FTC could benefit from streamlining the complaint process for
disclosure violations through an online reporting platform and
requiring specific details on how the disclosure violation occurred. 130
The agency has already created an online platform for consumers to
report fraud, 131 and the FTC could create a similar online reporting
126. See Harris, supra note 35, at 980–81.
127. District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/
services-forms/fees/district-court-miscellaneous-fee-schedule
[https://perma.cc/TH2M-DVG9] (last visited Sept. 6, 2021).
128. For example, the FTC can charge an administrative fee when its records are requested
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Will I Be Charged Fees, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/foia/will-i-be-charged-fees [https://perma.cc/
GW3K-XCN7] (last visited Sept. 6, 2021) (citing 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b)) (“If we estimate
that the fees for processing your request will exceed $25, we will not begin to process
it without your permission. Fees are determined based on the type of requester you are
(commercial use, news media/education/non-commercial scientific institution, and all
others, including members of the general public) . . . .”).
129. See What Happens to a Claim for an Informant Award (Whistleblower), IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/what-happens-to-a-claim-for-an-informant-awardwhistleblower [https://perma.cc/G6Y3-4UZZ] (Mar. 22, 2021).
130. See Streamlining, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/
knowledge/strategy/streamlining/ [https://perma.cc/RFV2-YYKF] (last visited Aug.
29, 2021); Whistleblower Office, supra note 123 (noting that whistleblower claims
require specific details and explanations for the submission).
131. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces New Fraud Reporting Platform
for Consumers: ReportFraud.ftc.gov (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2020/10/ftc-announces-new-fraud-reporting-platformconsumers [https://perma.cc/3RDQ-7SZ5] (on file with author). The FTC saw a
significant uptick in fraud during the COVID-19 pandemic. See Press Release, Fed.
Trade Comm’n, FTC Data Shows Big Jump in Consumer Reports About Scams
Originating on Social Media (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2020/10/ftc-data-shows-big-jump-consumer-reports-about-scams-originating
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platform for disclosure violations that would serve as a more efficient
reporting mechanism. 132 Adding an incentive to encourage reporting
is likely to increase the volume of reporting, so a tailored approach to
the reporting process is essential for implementation.
C. To Resolve the Market Failure, Congress Should Enable the
FTC to Award Consumers for Information in Conjunction with
Other Solutions.
Influencer endorsement is one of the best ways for brands to access
consumers in the most seemingly authentic way. 133 Positive
influencer endorsements can have a significant effect on the success
of a product, and the more “honest” a review, the more likely
consumers will purchase the product. 134 Researchers have struggled
to estimate how many endorsement disclosure violations go
unreported, 135 and there may be significantly more violations than are
apparent and reported. 136 Influencers may be unaware that they are
violating the endorsement disclosure regulations, 137 or they may feel
that they lack an incentive to disclose material connections with
brands. 138
Brands and influencers may risk irreparable harm to their
reputation from failure to disclose because consumers expect
transparency; however, they also fear reputational harm even if they
disclose a sponsorship. 139 Advertisers know that sponsored content
labeled with #AD or #Sponsored incurs significantly less engagement
on social media platforms. 140 In their quest to convey authenticity,

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

[https://perma.cc/5ERD-LM4A] (on file with author). This reporting system was a
response to the increased need. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMERS
DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: A YEAR IN REVIEW 5 (2021),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/protecting-consumers-duringcovid-19-pandemic-year-review/covid_staff_report_final_419_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5ERD-LM4A].
See Harris, supra note 35, at 980–81 (“[T]he FTC should add a specific category
labeled ‘Social Media Endorsement Violations,’ so that the process is easier for
consumers to create timely complaints for deceptive advertising violations.”).
See Maheshwari, supra note 5.
See Brucculieri, supra note 4.
See Boerman et al., supra note 15, at 159.
See id. at 158.
See id. at 159.
Bannigan & Shane, supra note 21, at 259. Researchers have considered numerous
factors to assess the lack of compliance. See Boerman et al., supra note 15, at 157–59.
Bannigan & Shane, supra note 21, at 259–60.
Maheshwari, supra note 5.
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brands and influencers may risk the liability associated with
inventing ways around endorsement disclosure. 141
In practice, many influencers and product reviewers try to mention
all connections they may have with a brand. 142 Some are explicit
about whether they received a product for free, 143 and many are quick
to inform consumers that they paid for a product with their own
money. 144 However, influencers and brands who violate endorsement
disclosure rules demonstrate that reputational effects have not
eliminated the market failure. 145 Consumers have the right to know
about material connections because this knowledge allows consumers
to rationally select from marketplace options without the interference
of misrepresentation. 146 Congress should correct the market failure
by enabling the FTC to grant consumer awards as an enforcement
tool that will enhance reporting.
The FTC potentially has the authority to make rules that allow
consumer awards for information on endorsement disclosure
violations. 147 However, such trade regulation rules are rarely drafted
because of arduous procedural processes. 148 In addition, some
commissioners have argued against broad rulemaking authority,
Audiences “have a very visceral reaction to ‘#ad’ or ‘#spon’ or
whatever it is, where they don’t want to know people are getting
paid for stuff even if they are,” said Jaclyn Johnson, president of
creative services at Small Girls PR, where she connects brands
like L’Oréal Paris and Urban Decay cosmetics to influencers who
have large social media followings. “A few bloggers we work
with say, ‘I want you to know, my engagement on posts that are
tagged “#ad” or “#spon” get lower engagement than if that wasn’t
there.’”
Id.
141. See Bannigan & Shane, supra note 21, at 258–61. However, “recent reexaminations
of consumer attitudes toward sponsored content suggest both the brand and the
consumer stand to benefit from transparency.” Id. at 261.
142. See Boerman et al., supra note 15, at 158–59.
143. See id. at 158–59.
144. See, e.g., Brucculieri, supra note 4.
145. See Yonathan A. Arbel, Reputation Failure: The Limits of Market Discipline in
Consumer Markets, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1239, 1241–45 (2019).
146. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of
Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 721–22, 742 (1997).
147. See 16 C.F.R § 1000.1; A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s
Investigative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, supra note 42; Barbara
Cohen, Comment, Substantive Rulemaking and the FTC, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 178,
180–81 (1973).
148. HOOFNAGLE, supra note 36, at 101.
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specifically related to new privacy legislation. 149 Similar opposition
is possible if the FTC took a rule-making approach for consumer
awards. Congress could draft legislation creating a fund for the
awards to be issued from, as they did for the SEC awards in 2012.150
Other solutions may be necessary in conjunction with consumer
awards as an enforcement tool. 151
Awarding consumers for information would be an efficient
enforcement tool because the cost of obtaining information on
complaints could decline if the FTC had more thorough and complete
information from various sources. 152 The FTC could focus its efforts
on investigating complaints and filing enforcement actions.
Meanwhile, social media platforms, watchdog groups, and individual
consumers could monitor compliance and develop cases against
repeat violators. 153 Watchdog groups already exist as consumer
protection nonprofits. 154 These groups have the expertise to monitor
endorsement disclosure as well as hold advertisers and influencers
accountable in partnership with the FTC. 155 A market could develop
to find and report violations beyond the scope of the FTC’s abilities.
By offering consumer awards, the FTC could enhance the monitoring
capacity of individual consumers and watchdog groups.
In addition, social media platforms may have an incentive to
monitor their sites more closely for violations if the FTC offered an
award for reporting disclosure violations. 156 The FTC could more
effectively enforce against repeat violators by granting an award to
149. See John Hendel & Cristiano Lima, FTC Chairman Tells Congress: Don’t Give Me
Too Much Power, POLITICO (May 8, 2019, 5:33 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/
2019/05/08/ftc-chairman-congress-rulemaking-authority-1418237
[https://perma.cc/34G3-5EXH].
150. Cf. Press Release, SEC Issues Record $114 Million Whistleblower Award, supra note
120.
151. See supra Section III.A.
152. Cf. Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adds Clarity, Efficiency and
Transparency to Its Successful Whistleblower Award Program (Sept. 23, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-219
[https://perma.cc/CRR9-FZJ8]
(“The SEC’s whistleblower program was created to incentivize individuals to report
high-quality tips to the Commission and assist the agency in its efforts to combat
wrongdoing and, as a result, better protect investors and the marketplace.”).
153. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Our Mission, TRUTH IN ADVERTISING, https://www.truthinadvertising.org/
about/ [https://perma.cc/NTZ5-JN8F] (last visited Sept. 6, 2021); see also Consumer
Protection Organizations, THE PUBLIC VOICE, https://thepublicvoice.org/issues_and_
resources/consumer-protection-organizations/ [https://perma.cc/7726-GA52] (last
visited Sept. 6, 2021) (listing watchdog groups from around the world).
155. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.
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social media platforms. 157 Social media platforms may be in the best
position to report violations, especially since they have access to the
content containing the violations, even if it is unlisted. 158
The FTC frequently enters into consent agreements where no civil
penalty is enforced unless there are additional violations after the
Commission issues an administrative order. 159 In addition, Congress
should consider proposals to allow the FTC to impose civil penalties
through administrative processes. 160 Some have been hesitant to add
this enforcement power because of concerns related to due
process. 161 However, the FTC’s efforts are crippled by the need to
enter into toothless settlement agreements. 162 The Commission
should have the discretion and authority to issue fines, even for firsttime violations. The administrative hearing process provides due
process protections, and respondents have the option to appeal the
decision. 163
A consumer is unlikely to recover in a civil suit against an
influencer who misguided them because proving any damages
beyond nominal would be challenging in most cases. 164 Therefore,
when a consumer has been lied to, the consumer relies on the
enforcement efforts of the FTC for redress. 165 Although the amount
of money would be substantially less significant than the
multimillion-dollar awards that the SEC grants, 166 Consumer awards
could act as a small, supplementary form of redress for consumers.
Notably, the FTC frequently struggles to recover damages in
enforcement actions. 167 Therefore, consumer awards could be rare.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

162.

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.
Harris, supra note 35, at 973–78.
See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
HOOFNAGLE, supra note 36, at 117 (“The FTC has extraordinarily broad jurisdiction
and an impressive set of legal tools to address unfair and deceptive practices.
Concerns about due process problems have prevented the Commission from obtaining
a general civil penalty power.”).
See Harris, supra note 35, at 973–78 (“The repeated warning letters and previous
settlement agreements demonstrate how the FTC is just giving social media
influencers and companies endless chances to comply with its guidelines, but without
any serious repercussions when they fail to do so.”).
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Press Release, SEC Issues Record $114 Million Whistleblower Award,
supra note 120.
HOOFNAGLE, supra note 36, at 94 (“[T]he FTC has to engage in significant
investigation and garnishments in order to fully collect.”).
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However, many FTC cases claim fraud, and the defendants are
already insolvent. 168 In cases involving influencers, and potentially
brands, the defendants are more likely to be capable of paying their
judgments than scammers. 169 By establishing a consumer protection
fund for awards, Congress could ensure that the money is available
when an enforcement action is successful. 170
Congress should consult the FTC and watchdog experts on the
most efficient methods of enforcement. Consumer awards would
provide an incentive to report violations, 171 and the FTC needs to
include this incentive as part of a multifaceted approach to
enforcement, especially as the internet marketplace rapidly
evolves. 172 Congress should recognize that the FTC has limited
resources, 173 and by partnering with consumers, advocacy
organizations, and social media platforms, the FTC could bolster its
efforts to regulate the influencer advertising market through private
sector reporting initiatives. 174
IV. CONCLUSION
For there to be “truth in advertising” and transparency in product
reviews, the FTC needs enforcement tools that have the potential to
keep pace with the global internet marketplace on social media.175
Influencers and advertisers are undeterred by legal and reputational
effects. 176 Influencers and brands currently have little incentive, aside
from fostering good will, to comply with disclosure requirements. 177
Congress should enact legislation which creates a fund for consumer
awards. 178 By offering an incentive to report, the FTC would
168. See id.
169. See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text.
170. Cf. Press Release, SEC Issues Record $114 Million Whistleblower Award, supra note
120.
171. Cf. Frequently Asked Questions, Office of the Whistleblower, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/frequently-asked-questions
[https://perma.cc/8MBY-83UY] (Dec. 10, 2021).
172. See supra notes 131–44 and accompanying text.
173. FED. TRADE COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEAR 2018 THROUGH FISCAL YEAR
2022, at 6, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/2018-2022-strategicplan/ftc_fy18-22_strategic_plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ5T-A75Q] (“[The FTC]
must make effective use of limited resources by targeting its law enforcement and
education efforts to achieve maximum impact and by working closely with federal,
state, international, and private sector partners in joint initiatives.”).
174. See supra notes 150–58 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 131–58 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 137–45 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 137–43 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 168–72 and accompanying text.
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encourage consumers, watchdog groups, and social media platforms
to join the enforcement effort. 179 Until consumers have an incentive
to report frequently and accurately, the FTC cannot effectively
enforce endorsement disclosure requirements, and influencers will
not have an incentive to comply. 180

179. See supra notes 150–56 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 131–55 and accompanying text.
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